# Inferring User Behaviors from Log Data for Understanding Computer Security Decisions

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- Socio-technical systems: people \* technology \* information
- "Black boxes": opaque about how inputs become outputs
- Three types of problems:
  - 1. Privacy issues related to sensors and derived data
    - Emilee Rader and Janine Slaker. "The Importance of Visibility for Folk Theories of Sensor Data" *SOUPS 2017*. <a href="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2017/soups2017-rader.pdf">https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2017/soups2017-rader.pdf</a>
  - 2. Algorithmic decision-making in social media (NSF Grant IIS-1217212)
    - Emilee Rader, Kelley Cotter and Janghee Cho. "Explanations as Mechanisms for Supporting Algorithmic Transparency". *CHI 2018.* doi: 10.1145/3173574.3173677
  - 3. Computer security decision-making about threats that are hard to be aware of and understand (NSF Grant CNS-1115926)
    - Rick Wash, Emilee Rader, and Chris Fennell. "Can People Self-Report Security Accurately? Agreement Between Self-Report and Behavioral Measures". *CHI 2017.* doi: 10.1145/3025453.3025911




Photo by Markus Spiske — <a href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/full-frame-shot-of-multi-colored-pattern-330771/">https://www.pexels.com/photo/full-frame-shot-of-multi-colored-pattern-330771/</a>

# Everyone faces security decisions on a daily basis...



Feb 22






Helpdesk Support Center, Due to congestion in all MSU Net users accounts you need to update your account with our released F-Secure Internet Security 2016. New version of a better resource spam and virus. If you have not upgraded your account, kindly fill in the columns below.

Failure to comply with Cyber-security regulation your MSU NetID account will be temporarily blocked or suspended from our network and you may not be able to receive or send e-mail due to non-compliance.

Full Name\*
MSU NetID\*
Password\*
Confirm Password\*

Thank you for your co-operation

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Select Password Confirmation

Change your Password ← Changing your Password periodically helps ensure the security of your account information.

\* Required field

#### **Change Password**


Enter your current Password, then choose and confirm your new Password.

Your new Password:


- Must be 8-32 characters long
- · Must include at least two of the following elements:
  - At least one letter (upper or lowercase)
  - At least one number
  - At least one special character from the following: #\$%'^,()\*+.:|=?@/][
    \_`{}\!;-~
- Must be different than your previous five Passwords
- Must not match your User ID
- Must not include more than 2 identical characters (for example: 111 or aaa)
- Must not include more than 2 consecutive characters (for example: 123 or abc)
- Must not use the name of the financial institution (for example: JPM, MORGAN, CHASE)
- Must not be a commonly used password (for example: password1)

Current Password *	
New Password *	
Confirm new Password *	

Change Password



everyday computer users: people without training in computer science or security who use computing technology and the Internet





A large proportion of attacks on the Internet **target vulnerabilities in end users** rather than vulnerabilities in technology (*Symantec*)

The majority of computers are compromised using vulnerabilities **for which a security update was available** but had not yet been installed (*Microsoft*)





A system's security depends on the choices made by its users.





One way to influence users' choices is to influence what they know about security.






receive mail with attachment. read and no security process mail. learning. HSSESS Lessons Situation Learned no immediately visible effect. Decide Hssess Consequences

open the attachment.

# Locky ransomware activity ticks up

Locky is now one of the most commonly seen types of ransomware






#### Jeremy Kirk

IDG News Service Mar 10, 2016 3:50 AM

Situation) Assess Lessons Learned Situation Decide Assess Consequences & AL+

The challenge: how to connect what people think and know about security, with the outcomes of the choices they make!







## How did we study this?

- Custom software development
  - Windows app (C# and PowerShell)
  - Web browser plugins for Firefox and Chrome (JavaScript)
  - Server software (PHP)
  - LOTS of analysis scripts (Python, MySQL, R)
- Six-week data collection
  - 134 university students (excluding CS and Engineering)
  - 53% Women, 46% Men
  - \$70 compensation




# How did we study this?









### Custom Web Browser Extensions

- What is a browser extension, anyway?
- Data we collected:
  - all URLs visited
  - download events

about 774,000 visits to 300,000 different distinct URLs 14,000 downloads 24,000 password entries 150,000 browser add-ons

- installed plugins and extensions
- all passwords (hashed!) and the webpage visits they were associated with
- from that we reconstructed browsing sessions





### Custom Windows App

- Windows can log a lot of stuff for developers...
- We turned all those logs on and collected data from them:
  - all processes that ran on the participants' computers
  - software installed
  - security settings
  - wifi and firewall logs
  - logon log
  - hardware and OS information
  - Windows (software) update information
  - crashes and shutdowns
  - and more...

1.5 million installed applications 11 million processes run 120,000 wifi connections 70,000 windows updates installed



#### Server Software and Database

- Why did we need a server application?
  - Link browser plugin data and windows app data with participant survey data
  - Process the data and store it in the database
- Why a backend database?
  - Well, what's the alternative?
  - Think about it as lots of spreadsheets that reference each other...







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	server_log	4661592	33.74 GB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	study_monitor_log	2488	144.00 KB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	latin1_swedish_c
	study_summary	189	48.00 KB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	tab_fork	89126	32.56 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	latin1_swedish_c
	users	190	48.00 KB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	visit_facts	965808	88.61 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	visits	964761	103.62 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
Ш	win_backup_log	218	1.52 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
Ш	win_computer_hardware	e 366	80.00 KB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_current_desktops	1983	320.00 KB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_defender_settings	211	64.00 KB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_error_reporting_log	426743	669.00 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_firewall	33970	7.52 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_group_user	3240902	709.00 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_installed_application	ns 1470924	448.98 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_installed_apps	27135	14.52 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	latin1_swedish_c
		0	16.00 KB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_log	60	16.00 KB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_logical_disks	22921	2.52 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_logon_log	3844447	1.64 GB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_ms_antimalware_lo	g 83140	56.59 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_operating_system	530	160.00 KB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_pnp_log	13857	11.52 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_power_log	809542	350.95 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_process_log	2736449	10.60 GB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_processor_log	1245107	178.72 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_security_products	139768	15.52 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_security_settings	34563	5.52 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_server_log	701409	86.03 GB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_status	7559	1.52 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_study_assistant_log	3263459	1013.00 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_sys_restore_log	17663	8.52 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_update_api	84394	19.55 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_update_client_even	t_log 3332688	1.15 GB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_update_wmi	44121	5.52 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_user_account	34979	4.52 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci
	win_wifi_log	655464	483.00 MB	InnoDB	2016-09-05 16:33:58	utf8_general_ci


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# Privacy and Ethics Issues





### Informed Consent

- IRB approval for "spyware"
- Multiple users on a single machine
- Giving people the ability to turn off the data collection
- What is the right amount to compensate people?





## Privacy and Log Data

- Logging browsing activity
  - sensitive activities
  - illegal activities
- Logging passwords
  - risk of compromise
  - password reuse





## Privacy and Log Data

- Logging Windows operating system data
  - software update state
  - installed software and versions
  - anti-virus installed, in use?
  - time spent doing certain activities





### Anonymization

- "Data can be perfectly useful or perfectly anonymous but never both" —Paul Ohm
- What does "identifiable" data look like?
- What log data might be identifiable?
- What might participants not want us to infer about them?






# Sharing and Reproducibility

- Our dataset is a snapshot in time
- Our custom software is brittle
- Risk of re-identification
- How to share code, datasets?
- How to prevent unintended uses?
- Long-term storage issues








#### Influencing Mental Models of Computer Security


Contributors: Emilee Rader, Rick Wash

Date created: 2016-10-20 12:05 PM | Last Updated: 2016-10-28 06:43 PM

Category: Project

Description: This project investigates how mental models of computer security are formed, how ideas and information about computer security are incorporated into mental models, and how they are transmitted from person to person. It measures the prevalence of different mental models and correlates them with logs of actual security behaviors. Through these investigations, this project seeks to characterize the reasons that many everyday computer users choose not to act securely — a question which is one of the biggest challenges of computer security.





βO

Public

#### What did we learn?

Current technologies make it difficult for individuals to learn about security:

- Automating the install of software updates makes it harder for people to learn how to make decisions about updates because there are fewer opportunities to learn [SOUPS 2014].
- More knowledge about security or technical issues is not associated with more secure behavior [SOUPS 2015].
- People can only accurately self-report security behaviors that are discrete and have visible outcomes [CHI 2017].





#### What did we learn?

People generalize security learning from one system to other, technically unrelated systems:

- Negative experiences with software updates create spillover, or a refusal to install even unrelated updates [CHI 2014].
- People re-use passwords they must enter frequently on many other websites, most likely because it is easiest to recall [SOUPS 2016].





#### References

[CHI 2014] Vaniea, K., Rader, E., and Wash, R. "Betrayed By Updates: How Negative Experiences Affect Future Security". DOI: 10.1145/2556288.2557275

[SOUPS 2014] Wash, R., Rader, E., Vaniea, K, and Rizor, M. "Out of the Loop: How Automated Software Updates Cause Unintended Security Consequences". https://www.usenix.org/system/files/soups14-paper-wash.pdf

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[SOUPS 2016] Wash, R., Rader, E., Berman, R., and Wellmer, Z. "Understanding Password Choices: How Frequently Entered Passwords are Re-used Across Websites". https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2016/soups2016-paper-wash.pdf

[CHI 2017] Wash, R., Rader, E., and Fennell, C. "Can People Self-Report Security Accurately? Agreement Between Self-Report and Behavioral Measures". DOI: 10.1145/3025453.3025911





#### How did I learn to do all this stuff?

- A long time ago, I took a couple of programming courses
- To learn, I relied a LOT on code other people had written
- Worked with (or near!) people who knew more than me and asked a LOT of questions
- Came up with projects that were interesting enough to me that I needed to learn these things
- Made a lot of mistakes, learned from them, got better
- A lot of this is learning about how to organize the work and what I should do myself vs. what I should hire or find collaborators to do...





# Thank you!

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